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Abstract 
In a market setting with perfect information, a con- 
sumer recognizes that he can influence the state-contin- 
gent returns, and hence the price, of his risky debt by the 
decision variables that determine the collateral and prom- 
ised payments. This paper examines the effect of bank- 
ruptcy laws on the feasible consumption opportunities of 
borrowers and lenders in order to determine the necessary 
requirements for the bilateral debt market to be perfectly 
competitive. 
Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the properties of a de- 
centralized general economic equilibrium with financial 
markets that consist of shareholder interest in firms and 
bilateral debt contracts. The characteristics of a stock 
market economy when consumer default is ruled out by 
restrictions on consumer behavior are discussed in Dia- 
mond 151, Dreze [ S ] ,  Gevers [8], Hart [13], and Grossman 
and Hart [ll]. Markets for firms' shares are assumed to 
exist as an imperfect substitute for the complete contin- 
gent commodity markets in the Arrow [l] and Debreu [4] 
models. However, the problem of consumer default in a 
general equilibrium framework has been pursued exclu- 
sively in the context of a central clearing market. Stigum 
[17, 181 and Arrow and Hahn [2] introduced the current 
settlement aspects of default, Grandmont [9] considered 
the impact of the anticipation of future default, and 
Green [lo] has dealt with both aspects simultaneously, In 
a central clearing market, consumers lack full informa- 
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tion concerning the identity of the issuer of contracts 
they buy. In contrast, a bilateral debt market depicts 
contracts as being created through a process of negotia- 
tion between a set of consumers. Consumers are assumed 
to possess full information concerning the identity and 
collateral assets of the obligors to all contracts. Thus, dis- 
tinct loan contracts will exist for each borrower. 
In the second section, we define the spanning sets for 
consumers under four alternative bankruptcy laws, and 
we investigate the implications for market completeness. 
The role of the bankruptcy laws in creating new securi- 
ties is examined by determining the conditions under 
which the existing spanning sets of consumers will be vi- 
olated. If no consumer has the ability to alter the span- 
ning set of another consumer and if all consumers act as 
though perfect substitutes sell for the same price, then 
the Grossman and Stiglitz [12] spanning and competitiv- 
ity requirements imply that the bilateral debt market will 
be perfectly competitive. (See Ekern and Wilson [7], Rad- 
ner [16], Grossman and Stiglitz [12], and Baron [3] on 
spanning sets and the requirements for perfect competi- 
tion.) In such a market, arbitrage will prevent consumers 
from borrowing or selling short unlimited amounts at a 
fixed price. 
In the third section, we formulate and describe the 
properties of a general economic equilibrium model with 
a perfectly competitive stock and bilateral debt market. 
The unique allocation of investment and consumption is 
derived by solving for a pseudo-default form of the equi- 
librium. This equilibrium is obtained by having con- 
sumers select current consumption and a security portfo- 
lio from among existing securities subject to a constraint 
which is equivalent, in its impact, to the imposition of a 
default rule. For example, a nonnegativity constraint on 
state-contingent consumption is equivalent, in its im- 
pact, to the imposition of an unlimited liability default 
rule. 
Properties of a Bilateral Debt Market in a General 
Equilibrium Setting 
Economic Environment 
The economy has two periods, one nonstorable good 
and S possible second-period states, I consumers, and J 
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firms. The following assumptions describe the behavior 
of the agents in the economy and the market setting. 
Firms. Each firm, indexedj = 1, . . . , J ,  possesses a 
unique production function, V j ( I j ;  s), specifying firm out- 
put V j  of the single commodity in state s as a function of 
the level of investment I j  in period 1. When I j  is s u p  
pressed, firm investment is assumed to be fixed. Firms 
issue limited liability equity claims that trade in a perfect 
securities market and have a total market value P j .  There 
exist B riskless bonds offering the certain return V, = 1 
with current price PB per bond. The market-clearing con- 
ditions are Ci x j j  = 1, j = 1, , . . , J and Ct b ,  = B where xc 
denotes the proportion of the market value of the j-th 
firm and bi the number of bonds held in the i-th con- 
sumer's portfolio. 
Consumers. There exist I consumers, indexed by i = 
1, . . . , I, each possessing a concave utility function and 
endowments of the consumption good, Y; and Yi(s), in 
periods 1 and 2, respectively, and a portfolio of existing 
securities, C j  x,Pj + biPB, where Xu is the i-th con- 
gumer's endowed percentage holding of the j-th firm and 
b i  his endowed number of bonds. Consumers make deci- 
sions so as to maximize their expected utility of con- 
sumption over the two periods, EU"(C1, C2(s)) ,  using 
their own subjective probabilities, for the occurrence of a 
given state. 
Information structure. All consumers possess com- 
plete information concerning the state-contingent re- 
turns and prices of all securities. This includes complete 
information concerning the obligor, the promised pay- 
ment, and the collateral for all contracts on which default 
is a possibility. All consumers know and willingly con- 
form to the laws governing defaulted contracts. 
In time-state preference general equilibrium models, 
each consumer maximizes EUi(Ci ,  C',(s)) subject to a 
budget constraint on period 1 consumption and invest- 
ment where typically Vj(s )  and V ,  are regarded as fixed 
constants independent of his or any other consumer's 
portfolio decision. This would appear to be a reasonable 
assumption that follows directly from the fact that Vj(s )  
is defined to be the second-period market value of the to- 
tal output of f irmj in state s and VB is the second-period 
market value of the original supply B of bonds guaran- 
teed for all states by some riskless vendor like the gov- 
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ernment, and no consumer is capable of influencing either 
of these quantities. However, in the derivation of the 
first-order conditions, there is nothing to prevent con- 
sumer i from taking a short position in stocks (i.e., xii < 
0) or in bonds (i.e., bi < 0). Whenever a consumer sells a 
security short, he increases the total promised supply of 
that security by the amount of the short sale. This incre- 
mental amount of promised supply, however, is the obli- 
gation of the short seller and not of the firm or riskless 
vendor. Hence, even though each firm does produce Vj(s )  
in state s and the government pays VB on bonds in all 
states, it may still be the case that some short seller will 
def auk on his commitment. 
If default by short sellers is possible and consumers 
know this, it is inappropriate for consumers to treat the 
quantities Vj(s )  and VB as fixed constants independent of 
the seller or obligor for the security. For example, with 
the assumptions of perfect information and the assump 
tion that only bonds are sold short, a consumer i desiring 
to buy b bonds should recognize that he may do so either 
from a short seller of bonds (i.e., some consumer k with 
bk < 0 )  or from another consumer who is selling some of 
his initial endowment of bonds, but who maintains a net 
long position (i.e., some consumer h with b h  - &h < 0, but 
bh > 0). If consumer i buys bi bonds from consumer h, the 
return from this purchase will be the riskless amount 
biVB. If consumer i buys b j  bonds from the short seller 
consumer k, then the return from this purchase will be 
the uncertain amount biRk(s) where 
(v" 
andAk(s), with min,(Ak(s)) = 0, represents the return in 
state s on the collection of assets that constitute the lim- 
its of liability to the k-th consumer's short position. The 
payoffs specified in equation (1) imply that if the short 
seller defaults at  all, he defaults on his entire short posi- 
tion, and each buyer is then entitled only to his pro rata 
share of the collateral asset return A k(S)m 
The possibility of consumer default implies that 
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short sellers (borrowers) will produce a security, such as 
in equation (l), which is not a perfect substitute for the 
asset sold short. In order for consumers (both borrowers 
and lenders) to make portfolio decisions in this instance, 
they must know the structure of payoffs and prices for 
securities being produced by borrowers. Unlike the situa- 
tion in competitive markets without consumer default in 
which the identity of one’s trading partner is economi- 
cally irrelevant, in bilateral debt markets with default it 
is no longer possible for traders to remain anonymous be- 
cause contracts with different consumers may have dif- 
ferent returns and prices in equilibrium. 
The unique feature of any contract on which default 
is a possibility is that its return is contingent on the oc- 
currence of one of two events-default versus no default. 
The return in the event of no default will be called the 
promised payment ( V B  in equation (l)), and the return in 
the event of default will be called the collateral payment 
( -Ak(s ) lbk ) .  The default state is defined to occur when- 
ever the collateral payment is less then the promised pay- 
ment. When a consumer sells the riskless asset short, the 
promised payment is nonrandom. When a consumer 
shorts a risky asset, the promised payment will be 
uncertain. 
The specification of the collateral payment deter- 
mines the limits to the liability on debts. It will be as- 
sumed that the general class of assets that could serve as 
collateral will be defined by exogenously given institu- 
tional and legal provisions governing defaulted con- 
tracts. Within this general class of assets, however, bor- 
rowers and lenders will be free to negotiate a specific 
composition for the collateral on debts. 
Default rules. Four different possible bankruptcy 
rules, each specifying the collection of assets serving as 
collateral in the event of default, are defined below for the 




All other assets held by a consumer (e.g., A,(S)  = 
All other assets held by a consumer with the 
exception of his return to human capital (e.g., 
cj X k j V j ( S )  + Yt(S)). 
A , (s )  = Cj  ~kjVj (s ) ) .  
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3. All other assets held by a consumer less a provi- 
sion for some subsistence level of consumption 
4. Only the consumer’s return to human capital (e.g., 
Cmin(s), (e.g.9 A,(s)  = cj xkjVj(s) + Yi(s) - ~ m i n ( ~ ) ) .  
Akb) = Y%)). 
Rule 1 represents unlimited liability. In this in- 
stance, default implies that the consumer’s consumption 
in the second period is zero. Rules 2, 3, and 4 represent 
alternative forms of limited liability. For each of these 
rules, a consumer will default even though his ability to 
consume in the second period has not been driven to zero. 
In the event of default, the i-th consumer’s consumption 
in the second period for rules 2, 3, and 4 will be, respec- 
tively, ci(s) = Yi(s ) ,  ci(s) = cmin(s), and &(s) = 
There are obviously other alternative default laws 
that could be defined. The most general rule would per- 
mit borrowers and lender to adopt any mutually agreed 
upon collection of assets as the collateral on debts. Such a 
default rule would be difficult to model, and it is felt that 
it would be more appropriate to begin the general equilib- 
rium analysis of a bilateral debt market using the previ- 
ously defined four rules, each of which has been previ- 
ously used in the literature on consumer default. 
I t  is assumed that default can only occur on a short 
position on at most one security, and bonds are selected 
as that security. This assumption allows us to isolate the 
effect of default itself from an exceedingly complex 
schedule of “me-first” or priority rules that would be 
needed to unambiguously specify each creditor’s claim to 
the collateral in the event of default on more than one 
security. 
Finally, given the assumed stock-bond market struc- 
ture, default rules of some kind are clearly required to de- 
fine returns in default states. However, it should be noted 
that for other market structures, such as one with a com- 
plete set of state-contingent contracts and perfect infor- 
mation, default rules would be unnecessary as consumer 
budget constraints would insure that default never 
occurs. 
cj X U V j ( S ) .  
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Consumers’ Spanning Sets with a Stock and Bilateral 
Debt Market 
The form of the default rule affects the spanning set 
of consumers and degree of completeness of the stock and 
bilateral debt market. The concept of a spanning set, first 
introduced by Ekern and Wilson [7], and the concept of a 
complete market, first introduced by Arrow [l], have 
been limited in their application to markets in which con- 
sumers do not or cannot default. The meaning of these 
concepts in the context of a bilateral debt market can be 
clarified by defining the following S dimensional vectors: 
. . . , Yi(S))’ ,  and cr= (c;(l), . . . , ci(S))’. 
Let C,t = [c2 IG(s) I 0 for all s] be the set of all possi- 
ble nonnegative, state-contingent patterns of second- 
period consumption for any consumer. The set Mb = 
[c iIcf ,= C j x i j V . +  biVB+ Yi,forallrealxijandbi]isthe 
spanning set,$orn the- thznsumer’s  perspective, for a 
market in which the possibility of consumer default is ig- 
nored. (If it is possible for some consumers to default on 
their obligations, and if consumers possess human capi- 
tal which produces a possibly unique pattern of returns, 
then it is possible that different consumers will perceive 
different spanning sets for the market.) Mb is the set of 
all patterns of state-contingent consumption that con- 
sumer i can construct for himself by forming feasible 
portfolios using the securities available in the market- 
place. 
A market is defined to be complete, from the i-th con- 
sumer’s perspective, whenever his spanning set contains 
the state-contingent consumption space C$. It is well 
known that a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
set M i  to represent a complete market is that S = J + 1 
and the vectors VB and V j ,  j = 1, . . . , J, be linearly inde- 
pendent (see Baron [3]).Then Mi Z) Cg. When the num- 
ber of linearly independent vectors V ,  and V j ,  j = 1, , . . , 
J is less than the number of states T t h e n  wi 2 C$ and 
the market is incomplete. That is, the market offers an 
insufficient variety of securities for the consumer to con- 
struct some patterns of state-contingent, second-period 
consumption in C$. 
v, = (1,. . . , l)’, vj = (Vj(1). , . . , V j ( S ) ’ ) ,  - Y; = (Yi(l), - 
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Define A i  = (Ai(l) ,  .. . , A,(&'))' to be the vector of 
statecontingent returns on the assets, specified by the 
default rules, serving as collateral on the i-th consumer's 
short position in bonds. 
Similarly, define Ri = (Ri(l) ,  . . . , Ri(S)) '  to be the 
vector of state-continGnt returns on the i-th consumer's 
short position in bonds where 
if A ~ ( s )  + biVB 2 0 
The set Mi = [cilc; = C j  x i j s  + biRi + p2, where 
Ai -= C j  xvVj  + Yi, for all real xii  and bi]% thespanning 
set, from tGi-thTonsumer's perspective, for the bilateral 
debt market when default rule 1 or unlimited liability 
holds. The effect is to redefine the return on bonds sold 
short in such a way that the Consumer's consumption in 
the second period is ci(s) = C j  x i iVj (s )  + biVB + Y;(s) in 
all states in which default does not occur and is zero in all 
states in which default does occur. This means that.an 
equivalent definition of the spanning set is M i  = [ci 1 ci = 
Cjxi jVj  i- biVs + Y~,forallrealxijandbisuchthatc\ I
- 01. T 6  impaxonthe spanning set of the recognition of 
consumer default given unlimited liability is equivalent 
to the explicit recognition that negative consumption is 
infeasible. Therefore, M', c C,+ and the market will be 
complete (incomplete) when the number of securities with 
linearly independent vectors of statecontingent second- 
period returns is equal to (less than) the number of 
states. 
The set M i  = [ci - -  1.; = Cj  xi jVj  + biRi + Y i ,  where 
A i  - = C j  x u V j ,  for all real xi i  and&] is thysp&ing set, 
from the i-a consumer's perspective, for the bilateral 
debt market when default rule 2 holds. Default rule 2 pro- 
hibits any creditor from garnisheeing a borrower's wage 
income in the event of default. An equivalent definition of 
thisspanningsetisM;=[[c;Ic"2CCjxiiVj+ b;VB+ Y;, 
for all real xli and b i  such that ci 2 YZKThe impactof 
default rule 2 (one form of limitgd l iamty)  on the span- 
ning set is equivalent to the impact of a constraint that 
prohibits any consumer from forming any portfolio that 
- -  
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could produce second-period consumption that is less 
than his wage income in some states. This means that M’, 
is a proper subset of Cg, and the market will be incom- 
plete regardless of the number of securities available in 
the marketplace. The market completeness characteris- 
tics of the spanning set M’, for default rule 3 are analo- 
gous to those for default rule 2 with the difference being 
that the constraint &(s) L: YL(s) for all s under default 
rule 2 is replaced with the constraint ci(s) 2: cmin(s) for all 
s under default rule 3. However, the spanning set is now 
identical across consumers. 
The set A&; = [cilci = C j  xGVj  + biRi + Yi, where 
A i  -= YL, for all real x i j  and bi] isthe spanning set, from 
the i - th  consumer’s perspective, for the bilateral debt 
market when default rule 4 holds. Default rule 4 restricts 
a creditor’s claim in the event of default to the borrower’s 
nonmarketable income. Such a situation could presum- 
ably arise if debtors could withhold from creditors any re- 
turns from their portfolio because the debtor, not the 
creditor, has physical possession of the claims in his in- 
vestment portfolio, thereby forcing the creditor to work 
through a debtor’s employer to place a lien on his income 
before the debtor receives it. Alternatively, it may be 
more realistic in this case to view Y\ as the return on 
some otherwise nonmarketable assetthat is serving as 
the collateral on the debt. 
Whenever a consumer promises a payment in some 
state on his short sale in bonds that exceeds his income in 
that state, the effect of default rule 4 is to redefine the 
return in that state on bonds sold short to equal the in- 
come payment in that state. This restricts a consumer’s 
ability to use short selling of bonds to achieve certain pat- 
terns of second-period consumption. Since M i  is a proper 
subset of Cg, the market is incomplete regardless of the 
number of distinct securities relative to the number of 
states. 
The contents of a consumer’s spanning set and its 
completeness depend upon (a) the trading rules of the 
market that define the feasible range for the values of x G  
and bi; (b) the bankruptcy rules that define the vector of 
returns on debts that consumers are capable of creating 
to alter second-period consumption; and (c) the number of 
linearly independent composite securities relative to the 
- -  - -  
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number of states. In summary, if the default rule is un- 
limited liability, rule 1, then the market can be complete 
(incomplete) if the number of securities with linearly inde- 
pendent vectors of state-contingent second-period re- 
turns is equal to (less than) the number of states. When 
any limited liability default rule (rule 2-rule 4) is as- 
sumed, the stock and bilateral debt market can be incom- 
plete regardless of the number of securities available. 
Perfect Competition in a Bilateral Debt Market 
Perhaps the single most important characteristic of a 
bilateral debt market is that when consumer default is a 
possibility, in most cases fairly stringent restrictions 
must be placed on consumer behavior in order to preserve 
the perfectly competitive aspects of the marketplace. The 
appropriate definition of perfect competition in markets 
with uncertainty has recently been the subject of an ex- 
tensive literature dealing with the production decisions 
of firms. (See for example, Merton and Subrahmanyam 
[15], Ekern and Wilson [7], Leland [14], and Baron [3].) 
Grossman and Stiglitz [12] have condensed all of the vari- 
ous special requirements for markets to be perfectly com- 
petitive into two general requirements called spanning 
and competitiuity. The spanning property refers to the 
situation in which no economic agent has the capability 
of altering consumption opportunities for any other con- 
sumer. The competitivity property requires that no eco- 
nomic agent have the capability of influencing the prices 
of available consumption alternatives, 
The spanning property required for perfect competi- 
tion to exist in the stock and bilateral debt market is Def- 
inition 1. 
Definition 1 -Spanning Requirement for Perfect 
Competition. 
Define Mi to be the spanning set, from the perspec- 
tive of the i-th consumer, of a market in which default 
rule r (r = 1, . . . , 4) applies. Then a market will sat- 
isfy the spanning requirement for competition if no 
consumer k has the capability of altering the span- 
ning set MC as viewed from the perspective of any 
other consumer i = 1, . . . , I. 
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When an individual’s debt is unique, and hence the 
spanning property defined in Definition 1 fails to hold, 
then it is possible that individuals have monopoly power. 
In a bilateral debt market in which consumer default 
is a possibility, short sellers need to know, in addition to 
the fixed market prices for available securities, a pricing 
function or schedule that specifies a different price for 
each level of the short position and collateral return. 
However, only when the bilateral market is a perfectly 
competitive market will the marketplace alone provide 
consumers with sufficient price information to construct 
the pricing function that is needed. 
In a perfectly competitive bilateral debt market, any 
return pattern that consumers can create by selling 
bonds short has a perfect substitute in the form of a port- 
folio of existing securities. In this instance, the pricing 
function that consumers can use is one that assigns a 
value to  a consumer’s short position in bonds that is 
equal to the market value of the portfolio that is the per- 
fect substitute for the consumer’s short position in 
bonds. Since in a perfectly competitive market, perfect 
substitutes must sell for the same price, the price-taking 
assumption that constitutes the second essential require- 
ment for markets to be perfectly competitive is Defini- 
tion 2. 
Definition 2-Competitivity. 
Whenever the spanning condition defined in Defini- 
tion 1 holds, then a market will be perfectly competi- 
tive whenever consumers act as though perfect sub- 
stitutes sell for the same price and they are incapable 
of influencing these prices. In particular, if it is possi- 
ble to find feasible portfolio weights aj, P B  such that 
Rk = C j  a.V. + PBVB, then the competitivity prop- 
&ty will ;& if coGumers act as though the price 
they must pay to acquire the return Rk is Lk = 
When it is possible for a consumer by selling bonds 
short to create a pattern of state-contingent returns for 
which a perfect substitute does not exist (i.e., when de- 
- 
cj (rjpj + P B P B .  
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fault rule 4 is assumed without additional trading rule re- 
strictions or under any default rule whenJ + 1 c S), then 
the market does not provide sufficient information for 
consumers to construct a pricing function. 
A General Equilibrium Model with Consumer Default 
The Model 
The market setting continues to be that described 
by assumptions 1-4 with the following additional 
as sump tion: 
5.  Perfect Competition. The Grossman and Stiglitz 
[ 121 spanning (Definition 1) and competitivity 
(Definition 2 )  requirements for perfect competi- 
tion are both satisfied. 
Initially, default rule 4 will be invoked. That is, liabil- 
ity is limited to a consumer’s nonmarketable return to 
human capital. It is assumed that default is only possible 
on short positions in bonds. 
Assumption 4 implies that debt contracts will be one- 
dimensional and is invoked a t  this point to make the anal- 
ysis as simple as possible. Notice that given assumption 
4, in order for assumption 5 to hold, all consumers’ return 
to human capital must be perfect substitutes for one an- 
other, and the trading rules in the market must restrict 
consumers to only create risky debt that can be dupli- 
cated by existing stock market assets. 
In a bilateral debt market, it is necessary to identify 
the obligor or the seller of contracts on which default is 
possible. In a bilateral debt market, it is also necessary 
that borrowers and lenders have equivalent control over 
each of the dimensions determining the returns on con- 
tracts on which default is possible. To accommodate 
these requirements, the following notation will be used: 
b i  = the number of bonds on which default can- 
not occur held by consumer i. Therefore, bi 
controls the amount of riskless borrowing 
or lending engaged in by consumer i. 
dik = the number of bonds on which default can 
occur that consumer i (acting as a lender) 
prefers that consumer k (acting as a bor- 
rower) sell short in total. Therefore, dik con- 
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trols the size of the total promised payment 
that consumer i prefers be offered on the 
debt of consumer k. 
Z i k  = the number of bonds on which default can 
occur purchased by consumer i from the 
short seller consumer k .  Therefore, Z i k  con- 
trols the amount loaned to consumer k by 
consumer i as a percentage of the total 
amount loaned to consumer k. 
R i k ( S )  = the return in state s per bond that is sold 
short by consumer k and on which default 
can occur when the short position is struc- 
tured according to the preferences of con- 
sumer i. For example, given assumption 4, 
In other words, R & ( S )  is the return in state s 
per unit of risky debt created by consumer k 
when the terms of that debt contract are set 
according to the preferences of consumer i. 
Lib = the market value per bond sold short by con- 
sumer k and on which default can occur 
when the return in state s per bond sold 
short is given by Rik(s).  In other words, L i k  
is the market value per unit of risky debt 
created by consumer k when the terms of 
that debt are set according to the prefer- 
ences of consumer i. 
To include the possibility that consumers enter the first 
period endowed with-previously held short positions or 
debts, the variables bi, d ik ,  and f i k  will be introduced to 
represent the initial endowment levels for the above- 
defined variables. 
Given this new notation, plus that previously de- 
fined, and the assumptions, the i-th consumer’s second- 
period consumption in state s is given by 
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In equation (2), the term diiRii(s) represents the returns 
that consumer i prefers to pay on any short position he 
takes in bonds on which he defaults in some states of na- 
ture. Finally, the term Ef=l ,z&ik(S) represents the re- 
turns consumer i receives by buying the debts of other 
consumers. Notice that the term in the summation for 
which k = i is ziiRii(s), which represents the number of 
bonds sold short by consumer i that are bought back by 
consumer i. It  is important to note that with the variable 
di i ,  consumer i can alter the total promised payment on 
the short position or debt that he issues. With dii fixed, 
the returns on this debt contract are fixed, and with the 
variable zi i ,  consumer i can, like any other consumer, 
trade in the debt security he has just created without al- 
tering the defined returns on that security. I t  must be r e  
membered that a short sale on which default is possible 
offers returns distinct from those on a short sale for 
which default is not possible, and therefore, the short sale 
on which default is possible will trade in the marketplace 
as a separate security. The process of a consumer buying 
a portion of the debt he issues has a more familiar inter- 
pretation in the context of a model that represents d e  
fault as occurring on personal debts made directly be- 
tween consumers or on loans made through a financial 
intermediary. For example, a consumer may take out a 
loan from a financial intermediary and effectively buy 
back a portion of that loan by buying stock in the finan- 
cial intermediary. Note that constraint (7) implies that dii 
must be positive if min,( Y&)) > 0. However, if consumer 
i does not wish to issue any risky debt, then he will select 
The i-th consumer's initial wealth, ignoring the set- 
tlement aspects of default in the first period, is given by 
zii = dij. 
I wi = Yi -k c X , j p j  + biPB - di;Lii + c Z i k L i k .  (3) 
j k = l  
The consumption-investment problem facing consumer i 
is 
subject to 
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bi(dii - zii) 2 0. (8) 
Constraint (5) is the i-th consumer’s budget con- 
straint. The range of short positions in bonds is defined 
by constraints (6) to (8). Constraint (6) identifies the 
range in which default cannot occur, (7) defines the range 
in which default occurs in at least one state (risky debt), 
and (8) insures that only one class of debt can be issued. 
Let hi, yis, s = 1, . . . , s, &k,  k = 1, . . . , 1, and t i  denote 
the multipliers associated with the constraints (5), (6), (7), 
and (8), respectively. 
It should be noted that two of the requirements for 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to provide both necessary 
and sufficient conditions for an optimal solution to the 
problem are not strictly satisfied: differentiability and 
convexity. Equations (4) and (5) have points at  which de- 
rivatives with respect to dik do not exist. Those points 
correspond to the situation where the number of states in 
which an individual defaults changes. At all other points, 
the functions are differentiable. We are assuming that 
the optimum is occurring at one of these points rather 
than including the cumbersome constraints to eliminate 
these points that would add little economic insight. 
Constraints (5) and (8) are bilinear forms, which have 
the characteristic of nonconvexity. To see the source of 
the nonconvexity in ( 5 ) ,  consider the case in which it is 
possible to define state-contingent prices qs, s = 1, . . . , 
S.  Then 
where 
s* = ( S I y t ( S )  2 ddkVB), andS’ = (S1 Y t ( S )  < dikVB). 
The last term inside the bracket of the equation causes 
the function to be nonconvex in Z i k  and dik . See Dreze [6] 
for a proof in another context and an example in Hart 
[13]. This nonconvexity will mean that the Kuhn-Tucker 
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conditions provide necessary but not always sufficient 
conditions for an optimal solution. 
The market-clearing conditions for the bilateral debt 
market given perfect competition are 
C x i i = l  j = l ,  ..., J (9) 
i 
C b i = B  1 (10) 
dii = dki for d k # i 
i =  1, ..., 1 
Condition (9) clears the market for equity shares in firms. 
Condition (10) clears the market for riskless debt, and 
condition (12) clears the market for risky debt. Condition 
(11) requires that all borrowers and lenders agree on the 
terms of all risky debt contracts. Due to assumption 4, 
debt contracts are one-dimensional and, therefore, con- 
dition (11) involves the single class of decision vari- 
Equivalent Representation of a Perfectly Competitive 
Equilibrium with Consumer Default 
In equilibrium, each consumer will have created for 
himself a particular state-contingent vector of second- 
period consumption that lies in his spanning set. How- 
ever, when perfect substitutes exist in the market, it is 
possible for the consumer to use different portfolios to 
generate the same consumption vector. I t  follows that 
there will exist multiple, equivalent representations of a 
perfectly competitive equilibrium with consumer default 
that differ only in terms of consumers’ relative invest- 
ment in a group of assets that are perfect substitutes. 
For example, in the previous section, an equilibrium was 
set forth in which consumers create specific debt obliga- 
tions with returns Rik( s )  for k = 1, . . . , I .  This represen- 
tation will be called the default form for general equilib- 
rium because it represents consumers creating securities 
for which default occurs in some states. However, an- 
other equivalent representation of equilibrium is one in 
which consumers are instead depicted as holding a short 
position in the portfolio of existing assets that is a per- 
ables d ik . 
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fect substitute for the debt obligations issued in the de- 
fault form equilibrium. By definition, that consumer can 
successfully honor the contracted payments in each state 
on his short position in that portfolio, and therefore it ap- 
pears as though no default is occurring. This representa- 
tion will be called thepseudo-default form for the general 
equilibrium. 
The notion and relevance of equivalent representa- 
tions for the general equilibrium can be made more rigor- 
ous by demonstrating the following: 
1. In equilibrium a consumer is indifferent at  the 
margin concerning his relative investment in as- 
sets that are perfect substitutes. 
2. Given a specific equilibrium in the default form, it 
is easy to express the equilibrium in the pseudo- 
default form. Given a specific equilibrium in the 
pseudo-default form, however, there may exist an 
infinite number of default forms for the equilib- 
rium. In this instance, it is impossible to solve for 
a unique structure to the bilateral debt market. 
3. It is possible to identify a set of constraints 
which, when applied to a model that is not ad- 
justed for default, will produce an equilibrium 
equivalent to any default form equilibrium. 
Consumer indifference between perfect substitutes. 
In order to distinguish so-called “existing” securities 
from securities that consumers are about to create, an ex- 
isting security is defined as one whose vector of returns is 
considered as fixed, whereas a security about to be cre- 
ated is one whose return vector is part of the current deci- 
sion set of consumers. With investment in firms fixed, 
the set of existing securities will include the equity secu- 
rities of firms and riskless bonds. To focus on the new 
debt issue, it is assumed that there are no preexisting 
debt contracts, (& = Z i k  = 0 for all i and k). 
Given this definition for the set of existing securities, 
it follows that the spanning and competitivity require 
ments for perfect competition imply that it must be pos- 
sible to find a set of weights ayiik and Pik  ( i ,  k = 1, . . . , I 
and j  = 1, . . . ,J) such that 
(13) 
j 
Rik(s) = c aijkVj(s) + PikVB for all i ,  k ,  s 
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and 
Lik = c CYGkPj + PikPB for dl i, k. (14) 
The weights are actually functions of the terms of the 
debt contracts. Given assumption 4, only the variables 
dik control these terms, and therefore the weights should 
be written as implicit functions of dik such as a'ijk(dik) and 
Pik(dik). To simplify the notation, the implicit function no- 
tation is suppressed. 
Expressions (13) and (14) can be substituted into the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the default form of the 
model. For example, since the Kuhn-Tucker necessary 
marginality conditions for the decision variables dik (k = 
1, . . . , I ) ,  consumer i's control of the promised payment 
of the k-th consumer's short position, is exactly equal to 
zero regardless of the value of d ik ,  then consumer i is in- 
different to the value of d ik .  It will now be shown that if 
consumer i has already selected his optimal portfolio of 
existing securities, given by xu and bi, then in perfectly 
competitive markets it appears that he is indifferent to 
the value of dik .  
Assume that it is optimal for consumer k to sell 
bonds short past the point in which he defaults in some 
state, implying that constraint (7) will be nonbinding and 
hence its multiplier is zero. Expressions (13) and (14) can 
be substituted into the Kuhn-Tucker condition and rear- 
ranged to give 
j 
for k # i. (15) 
At equilibrium, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for invest- 
ment in firms and riskless debt will hold, and when these 
conditions are substituted into (15) one obtains 
(16) 
where yis  and ti are multipliers associated with con- 
straints (6) and @), respectively. 
~ i h ( C  yis + Ei(dii - zii)) = 0 
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Equation (16) implies that whenever consumer i 
holds riskless bonds (yis = 0 for all s) and simultaneously 
issues risky debt ( t i  = 0), then since the marginality con- 
ditions for x i j  and b hold, it follows that the marginality 
conditions for the debt terms dik will also hold. Therefore, 
consumer i is indifferent to the debt terms d i k .  If con- 
sumer i holds riskless bonds (y is  = 0 for all s) and ti # 0, 
then dii = zii  and indifference to the debt terms dik fol- 
lows. On the other hand, if consumer i issues enough risk- 
less bonds so that y is  # 0 for some s and no risky debt is 
issued (dii - zii = 0), then in equilibrium it must be that 
Z i k  = 0, in which case consumer i is again indifferent to 
the debt terms dik . 
The pseudo-default form for the equilibrium. Assume 
that P?, . . . , Pj*, P$, and Lr, . . . , LT, constitute a set of 
equilibrium prices for the default form of the model and 
assume that ci*, x$, j = 1,. . . , J ,  b?, and d,*,, k = 1,. . . , 
I represent a set of equilibrium consumption and invest- 
ment decisions for consumer i for the default form of the 
model. This implies that the i-th consumer's second- 
period consumption in state s will be 
ci*(s) = c X $ V j ( S )  + b?VB - d&(S) 
i 
4- c z$Rik(s) + Y2(s) .  (17) 
k 
The spanning requirement for perfect competition re- 
quires that there exists a set of weights a!$k and p,*, such 
that 
Substituting (18) into (17) and after collecting common 
terms, we can write ci*(s) as 
Ci* (S)  = c (x$ - d&$i + c z,*,a$)Vj(s) 
I k 
+ (b: - d$p$ + C z $ / ~ , * , ) V B  + Y~(s). 
k 
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and 
6i = b? - d$p$ + C z X ~ X ,  (20) 
we can write the i-th consumer’s second-period consump- 
tion in state s as 
k 
ci*(s) = & *,Vj(S) + &V, + Y i ( S ) .  
J 
Therefore, consumer i can produce the identical s t a t e  
contingent pattern of consumption in the second period 
that he obtained in the default form of equilibrium by 
holding the portfolio gij, j = 1, . . . , J, and gi on which the 
consumer does not default on any security. 
Therefore, if Pi*, P:, LT, ci*, x;, b,*, and dz  consti- 
tute an equilibrium in default form, then the equivalent 
equilibrium in t\e pseudo-default form is given by Pi*, 
P$, ci*, f , ,  and b i .  The two equilibria are equivalent be- 
cause they produce the same aggregate level of invest- 
ment for each asset and the same level of statecontin- 
gent consumption for all consumers. 
Associated with any given default form of equilib- 
rium, there will be a unique pseudo-default form of equi- 
librium (assumingJ + 1 5 S). However, the converse of 
this statement is not always true. For example, there will 
not exist a unique default form equilibrium whenever a 
given equilibrium pattern of state-contingent consump- 
tion (given in (17)) can be duplicated using different val- 
ues for the portfolio demands x i j ,  bi, and dik aU of which 
continue to satisfy the market-clearing conditions. To see 
how such a situation might develop, assume that only 
consumer i holds a short position in bonds on which de- 
fault occurs for some states and that liability is unlimited 
(default rule 1). Then, in equilibrium, in those states in 
which default does not occur, the i-th consumer’s second- 
period consumption will be 
and in those states in which default does occur, consump- 
tion will be zero. Within the range of the decision vari- 
ables x i j ,  bi, and dii  in which the default status of each 
state does not change, any set of portfolio demands that 
satisfies (22) for the set of states in which default does 
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not occur will be equivalent to the equilibrium demands. 
However, whenever the number of states in which default 
does not occur is less than J + 1, then it is impossible to 
rule out the possibility that multiple sets of portfolio de- 
mands satisfy (22). 
Similarly, on the lending side, the second-period con- 
sumption for any consumer k # i in states in which de- 
fault by consumer i does not occur will be 
and in states in which default does occur will be 
+ YZ(s)) + Y i ( S ) .  
For a given set of portfolio demands for consumer i, there 
may be multiple sets of equivalent portfolio demands x k j ,  
b k ,  and zki for consumer k whenever J + 2 > S. 
The implications of this indeterminateness is that 
when competitive market assumptions hold, it may be 
impossible to determine the allocation of risky debt 
across consumers. This indeterminateness is analogous 
to the situation, also in perfectly competitive markets, in 
which it is impossible to determine the allocation of in- 
vestment across the firms within an industry. In each 
case, the indeterminateness results from the fact that 
consumers are indifferent to the relative level of invest- 
ment in assets that are perfect substitutes. 
Constraints for the pseudo-default form of the model. 
In the previous subsection, it was shown that given an 
equilibrium in the default form, it is a simple matter to 
specify the equilibrium in the pseudo-default form. How- 
ever, this does not imply that one can derive the pseudo- 
default form of equilibrium that is equivalent to the 
default form by simply solving an unconstrained optimi- 
zation in which default possibilities are ignored. How- 
ever, it is possible to specify a set of constraints that will 
produce a solution in pseudo-default form that is equiva- 
lent to any default form solution. In other words, in a per- 
fectly competitive economy, there exists a set of con- 
straints whose impact on prices, investment, and 
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portfolio demands is equivalent to the impact of the ex- 
plicit recognition of the possibility of consumer default. 
In order to identify the form of these constraints, it is 
necessary to refer back to equations (19) and (20), which 
related demands in the pseudo-default form (indicated 
with a ") to demands in the default form (indicated with 
an *). The only constraint restricting the feasible values 
of the variables to the right of the equal sign in (19) and 
(20) is the spanning requirement for perfect competition, 
which requires that the value of the weights ct!ijk and Pik be 
such that the returns on any debt securities consumers 
create lie within the spanning set. I t  follows that the con- 
straint that must be applied to the demands x i j  and b i  is 
that they produce only portfolios whose returns fall 
within the appropriate spanning set for this market. I t  
was shown that the spanning set for a bilateral debt mar- 
ket under default rule 4 is 
M i  = [c;lC;(s) = g xijvj  + biVB -- d&i - J -  
+ C Z i k R i k  + Yi, for all x i j ,  Z i k  and b i  
k - -  
and dii subject to (6), (711. 
Therefore, the constraint that must be placed on the se- 
lection of R ,  and 6, is that they fall in the set r4 where 
r4 = [(a,, S ~ ) I C R ~ V ~  + g i v B  - -  + Y ;  E M ; ] .  
3 -  
This implies that the solution to the following con- 
strained optimization will produce a pseudo-default form 
equilibrium with the same prices, investment, and state- 
contingent levels of consumption as any default form 
equilibrium produced by the stock and bilateral debt 
market model in (4)-(8): 
( x i ,  bi) E r4. (25) 
Constraint (25) can be written in a more explicit form 
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when default rule 1, 2, or 3 holds. For example, it can be 
recalled that the spanning set for the bilateral debt mar- 
ket when default rule l, or unlimited liability, holds can be 
written as 
. .  
Mi = [ c ;@ = cxijvj + biV, + Yk, - -  
j -  - 
for all x i j  and b i  such that ci I 01. 
It is clear, therefore, that when default rule 1 holds, the 
substitution for constraint (25) will take the explicit form 
Ck(S) = c xi jv j f s )  + biV, + Y g s )  2 0 
J 
for alls. (26) 
This means that when markets are perfectly competitive 
and Liability is unlimited, the impact of the potential for 
consumer default on equilibrium is equivalent to the im- 
pact of nonnegativity constraints on state-contingent 
consumption. 
Finally, the forms of the constraint for the case of de- 
fault rules 2 and 3, respectively, are 
ck(s) 2 Yi(s)  for all s (27) 
c;(s) I cmin(s) for all s. (28) 
and 
It is somewhat ironical that in perfectly competitive 
markets the impact of the possibility for consumer de- 
fault, in the case of default rules 1-3, should be equiva- 
lent to the imposition of constraints such as (26)-(28), 
which rule out the possibility of default occurring on a 
portfolio of existing securities. Of course, the reason for 
this result is that whenever these constraints are vio- 
lated, the role of the spanning requirement of perfectly 
competitive markets is to redefine the returns on securi- 
ties in such a way that these constraints are satisfied. 
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